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Economic Restructuring and the European Monetary Union
Juan Luis Mill~n Pereira*
I. Introduction
From the end of World War 11, Western economies enjoyed an intense and
almost continuous growth period which lasted about a quarter century. One the
factors contributing to this growth is the change that happened in the dominant
productive paradigm: a new way to organize work, fordism, large scale
production and mass consumption. One of the most important circumstances
for this change occured in the international sphere. The idea that national
borders are a barrier, a limitation for the optimal development of economic
activities ultimately prevailed over the mainly protectionist approach that was
characteristic of the previous period.
An especially important result of this new way of understanding trade
relationships is the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), an
agreement under which signatory States agree to end up progressively with the
barriers to free movement of goods and productive factors between States.
From now on, international trade shows an unparalleled development. This
development produces a radical change in the practice of private agents, now
carrying out their activity in an wider markets -sometimes worldwide markets
- and in a more competitive context. It also changes the practice of
governments, which are now compelled to create policies in collusion with the
liberalizing trade option that has been chosen. These changes are an important
impulse for the creation of regional trade blocks, whose structure, depending on
the cases, will be more or less formal. These regional trade blocks become
necessary spaces to warrant an optimal exploitation of productive specialization
and large scale production.
Of all available examples, the most outstanding are those of six states
during the Fifties: France, the German Federal Republic, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. In the sectorial sphere, they created in 1951
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), under which a common
market for that economic sector is established (article I, ECSC Treaty). In
1957, they created the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM),
whose aim was to collaborate on the establishment of the necessary conditions
for the creation of a common market of materials and specialized equipment in
the field of nuclear energy, as well as to collaborate on the fast development of
this industry (articles I and 2 of the EURATOM Treaty).
In the same year, another integration organization with a wider reach
was created: the European Economic Community (EEC), which intended to
achieve the creation of a customs union, the free movement of production
factors (persons, enterprises, services and capital), the free competition of
economic operators within that market, the harmonization of general economic
policies and the enforcement of common sectorial policies (agriculture,
transportation and trade relationships with third states).
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As we said previously, these three European Communities are
outstanding examples of trade blocks. First because, due to their impulse, trade
between the different associated States showed a very fast development, quite
higher than the one of other regional blocks. Secondly, because the formal
expression of these Communities is very advanced, and their organizational
structure is also well developed, reflected particularly by the part related to
integration organizations involving the cession of a certain degree of
sovereignty by member States to the supranational authority.
A. Economic Restructuring During the Eighties and World Market
Consolidation.
This scheme of economic and social reproduction shows its first
exhaustion symptoms in the late Sixties and suffered a crisis during the first half
of the Seventies. After a relatively long period of adjustment, the majority
response to the crisis - that finally turned out to be able to overcome the lack
of growth and the problems of unemployment and inflation- suppose a real
revolution of a great part of the economic principles dominant until that
moment. The element that introduced a great number of opportunities for
change was the intense rhythm of technological advances, especially the
advance in information technology.
From then on, a series of growth strategies are developed, strategies
involving the creation of actual integrated markets at a worldwide level in the
spheres of production, trade and finance. The great world corporations, which
now are now called transnational corporations, reduce the importance of
existing national links and emphasize worldwide distribution of different
production stages. Meanwhile, capital move freely through financial markets
that are totally integrated and operate in real time, searching for the most
profitable investment opportunities (both productive and financial). In other
words, multinational capital becomes the strategic factor of this new period of
accumulation.
This means that the process of change and modification of the material
basis of the economic organization was directed from the sphere of enterprises.
However, the change that happened was very difficult without the clear support
of the national governments to contribute actively to restructure the system.
Facing the paradigm of public intervention as a means to stabilize the
economy, to redistribute income and to solve the mistakes of the market, the
kindness of the market as an optimal mechanism to assign resources and with an
autonomic capacity of self-regulation - if the relationships between the agents
are established without exogenous interventions that may condition or limit
them, especially without those interventions from the public sector- prevails as
the dominant criterion.
The transformation of the patterns of government intervention is also
reflected in the budgetary sphere, where we can find strict limitations to the
growth of public expenditure in order to favor its financial reorganization and
the liberalization of the savings related to financing. It is also reflected in the
important and generalized processes of privatization of public enterprises that
take place, and in the reformation of the taxation systems in order to encourage
their neutrality -to the detriment of their redistributive capacity and of the
object of equity-, as well as in working relationships, that experienced a
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deregulation process affecting essential aspects of the traditional protection of
public sector to wage-earners.
This new orthodoxy defines a project with a conservative nature, a
project that later was called neoliberalizationL It starts in the United States and
the United Kingdom, but it spread progressively to all the developed world,
including the States belonging to European Economic Community, birthplace of
the mixed economy and of the modem welfare State, where an important part of
these changes were included in the Treaties modifying the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities.
B. International Trade and the European Union
As these international organizations are prominently economic in
nature, it is obvious that some parallels may be drawn between the necessary
reformation of the economic system to face changing circumstances and the
process of building European Communities. ECSC and EURATOM were, as
shown before, projects envisaged to establish an integrated sectorial space
between six European States. However, the EEC intended to achieve some
objectives that where more ambitious, especially:
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development
of economic activities, a balanced an continuous expansion, a
growing stability, the fast rising of standard of living and of closest
relationships between Member States (article 2, Treaty Establishing
the EEC, Rome, March-27-1957)
The main instruments that the European Communities used to reach
these objectives were designed according to the principles of a open market
economy and with free competition. I
The content of the Treaty of Rome is the result of a series of vectors
gathering in the same comprehensive strategy. This strategy is favored by those
liberalizing guidelines the European States engaged to under the agreements
signed to receive the aid of the Marshall Plan, and also by the determination of,
especially, Jean Monnet.2 Monnet, considered as Europe's father, was totally
convinced that, facing the trade policy that was commoner in the time of
reciprocal interchanges, the progress of Europe should be joined by the increase
of economic and trade interdependence, by the use of scale economies and the
amplification of the markets. This integrator option is the first stage of a long
process that involves the development of patterns entailing a reduction of the
discretionary performance capacity of nationals governments in the economic
subject.
However, at the beginning of the Eighties the EEC was just a privileged
example of a customs union, integrated by a series of countries with a deep
economic crisis, and its collaboration to solve this crisis was minimum. With a
huge lack of credibility and self-confidence, with its aims exhausted and with a
I Treaty Establishing the European Community, Part One: Principles, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 3.
2 Monnet made his name by the decisive role he played in France, with the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, for the establishment of theComnnissariat Gineral du
Plan, and the creation of a program to rebuild the crumbled French economy after the war and
to modernize the industry, what (since it involved a high degree of government intervention)
was called indicative planning.
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very limited policy, the situation was known as eurosclerosis or europesimism.
The relaunch of the European project would not be possible without a new
definition of its strategic guidelines, in order to adapt them to the political needs
and economic circumstances of the new historical moment.
The keys for the economic restructuring were based on two opposite
models: the liberal model, started by the governments of the United States and
United Kingdom, as it has been said before, and the social democrat model,
whose main exponent was the economic program applied in France when the
socialist Frantois Mitterrand became the President of the Republic. However,
the second model was soon rejected due both to the success of its "rival" and to
its relative failure a few years after its enforcement in France.
The first Mitterrand government proposed a classic program, based on
Keynes, where the public sector was placed in the center of the economic
recuperation project, and it was called la relance. that is. relaunch. Some of its
most important elements were the increase of the control and the public
coordination of the main economic sectors, the nationalization and/or the
increase of the government's presence as shareholder in many important
enterprises, the increase of the social expenditure, the reformation of the direct
imposition and the increase of the progressiveness of tax system, as well as a
certain degree of protection of the national industries in order to safeguard them
from the external competition.
But this program was clearly rejected by the economic powers,
especially by those who operated in the capital markets. National and
international investors, "scared" by the content of the socialist program, left the
country and, consequently, provoked an important crisis in the national stock
markets, what favored the depreciation of the franc, as well as continuous
speculative attacks to this currency, what involved a decrease of the economic
growth and an increase of the inflation.
The task of changing this process and of reorganizing French economy
was assigned to Jacques Delors, outstanding socialist politician who was in
favor of the so called "new left", and whose view of economy was very
influenced by Jean Monnet. In 1983 he was appointed as Minister of Economy,
Finances and Budgets, and he introduced some discipline and austerity in the
government action. He also undertook to keep the franc within the change
system of the European Monetary System (subject to previous parity
readjusts 3 ), what allowed the consolidation of the exchange system and
collaborated to the impulse of the process of Europe's economic integration.
The actual reach of these changes is remarkable, as they involve, on
the one hand, that agents operating in capital markets have the capacity to veto
and to prevent the success of a certain economic policy, especially when that
policy entails a higher degree of public intervention. On the other hand, it
involves the acceptation of the market's values (productiveness increases,
external liberalism, technological and efficiency improvements) as the actual
.1 Particularly, the German mark was revalued, whereas French franc was devalued in
order to adjust the value of both currencies to the changes in the economic circumstances and,
especially to those change of political nature, that took place. This fact supposed the end of
speculative attacks to the franc (as well as of its instability), whose value would now be very
stable (strong franc) and would evolution from now on in close connection to the mark.
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determinants in the societies material improvement.
So, the French social democrat model had faded away as the instructor
of the change that Europe needed to go out its paralysis. But neither the angle-
saxon model was supported by a considerable number of Community States.
The solution that was finally adopted had elements from both models,
although, in general, it involved a great deal of confidence in the markets, as
well as a determined support to economic globalization and trade liberalism.
From that derives a deep re-conceptualization of the role of the governments, as
well as the role of the Community institutions in the control and regulation of
the economies.
C. The Single European Act: the Consolidation of a New Economic
Project
The appointment of Jacques Delors as president of the European
Commission in 1984 helped to give a new rhythm to the process of building of
Europe from the second half ot the eighties, menaced by immobilist pressures
that had stopped the institutional development process and had blocked the
majority of the projects with a certain reach.
The new president was convinced that the understanding, regulation
and stimulus of the new economy and the economic progress were out of the
narrow national sphere. But, apart from determined will and conviction, to end
up with the immobilist inertia it was necessary to define one or some projects
that filled with enthusiasm Member States and got their unanimous support.
These projects were in collusion with the opinion, every time more popular, that
the public sector should play a reduced part in the economy's regulation. The
projects also were a determined support to the free-trade approaches that
advocated for a trade without or with scarce barriers: the single market and the
single currency.
Actually, none of two was really new, but now they were emphasized.
The single market was one of the wishes establishing EEC, but now it was
planned with a wider reach. Regarding the single currency, it had already been
foreseen in La Hague Congress in 1969 and defended in Werner Report (1970),
with other proposals related to the centralization of decision making on the
subject of monetary policy and control of liquidity creation processes.
Regarding the establishment process of the single market, it was
defined in the Single European Act, a Treaty modifying the Treaty Establishing
the EEC (1957), which, after it was approved by the twelve Member States,
entered into forced on July 1, 1987. In that Treaty was thoroughly accepted the
creation of a space with no barriers where persons, capitals and goods can move
freely. The 1 January 1993 was set as the limit date for its application.
The Single European Act supposed, for a lot of people, a deep change
in the orientation of the European integration process, whose keys experience a
relevant transformation. It involves a effective unblocking of the process of
creation of an integrated economic space, but we cannot see significant
advances in subjects related to the social, real and politic integration that had
always been a part of the dominant principles that had inspired the process of
building of a United Europe.
4
4 The different velocities that, especially from that moment on, get in Europe the
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In fact, no measures were established with the necessary intensity to
conceal the increase of territorial imbalances that probably would occur as a
consequence of economic integration and of the creation of a single market
between countries with a very different level of development. In this sense, the
various reports ordered by the Commission at the end of the eighties to analyze
this effects reached quite important conclusions. So, in the so-called Padoa-
Schioppa Report was stated that "regions just search to equal their per capita
incomes, as a result of the movement of capitals and workers, under some
exceptional conditions and not realistic at all [...] History and economic theory
show that any extrapolation of the 'invisible hand' theory to the real world of
regional economy, in presence of market opening measures, would lack of any
basement."
5
Moreover, P. Cecchinni Report suggested that market's liberalization
would worsen the regional unbalances and it would be necessary to apply
additional measures to facilitate the convergence of those less developed areas.
6
In the same sense, MacDougall Report, elaborated ten years before, talked about
the "intrinsically imbalacing" nature of the growth model supported by the
Community. This report also considered that a solvent correction of those
imbalances would need resources equivalent to between five percent and seven
percent of the Community GNP.
We can deduce from what we have said that the integration of unlike
economic structures and very different spaces does not guarantee an harmonic
and convergent development of standards of life in every geographic area, but
rather the opposite. The idea that with integration "we all win" is not fulfilled
because the market's expansion favors the richest areas, as they enjoy scale,
localization and integration economies (derived from the application of
advanced technologies, of the high degree of capital concentration, of the
proximity of auxiliary industries, of the easy connection with important
transport and communication centers, of the existence of highly skilled workers.
etc.).
As P. Krugman 7 remarks, these circumstances determine the
production's specialization in a quite higher degree than the comparative
advantage that might derive from a hypothetical availability of intermediate
inputs cheaper in the less developed countries that might contribute to its greater
relative development.
monetary and market integration processes on the one hand, and the economic and political
integration processes on the other hand have been very criticized See Michael M. Mussa,
Political and Institutional Commitment to a Common Currency, 87AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REVIEW 2, May 1997, 217-20;and V. Hagen. "Credible roads to EMU", in M. Uzan (ed.).The
financial system under stress. An architecture for the new world,. Routledge: New York, 1996.
Francisco J. Fonseca Morillo & Juan A. Martin Burgos, La Unidn Europea: gdnesis de
Maastrich, REVISTA DE INSTITUCIONEs EUROPEAS, n* 19, 1992, 517-561.
5 Padoa-Schioppa Report, Eficacia, estabilidad y equidad. Una estrategia para la
evolcirn del sisemna conrmico de la Comunidad Europea, 1987, p. 12 1.
6 PAOLO CECCHINI, ET. AL., THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE, 1992: THE BENEFITS OF A
SINGLE MARKET (John Robinson, ed Gower 1988).




However, it happened that over these advises there was a determined
will of all the governments to incorporate totally to the Community project: the
more developed States, due to the clear advantages that derived from this
process; and those less developed, because they wanted to end up with their
political isolation, since in most of the cases they had just ended up with a long
time of dictatorship. Another important reason for those less developed
countries were the specifics aids created to try to help their situation, Cohesion
Funds, even if their quantities were considerably far away from those estimated
as necessary, for instance, in MacDougall report8 .
D. The Single European Act and the Intervention of
Governments in the Economy
But the economic integration process defined in the Single European
Act with the (theoretical) aim of using the reciprocal advantages derived from
the governments' productive specialization, has also other relevant implications
related to the States' capacity to interfere and to regulate economic facts.
First of all, it supposes a effective transfer of decision spheres from
national capitals to Brussels, to the Community. Particularly, to the Commision,
that becomes a big autonomic official entity, with capacity to legislate on a
great amount of subjects and to impose its decisibns to Member States, who are
obliged to comply them and/or to include them in their internal legal systems.
However, differing from national governments, the Commision are just
submitted to a small parliamentary control.9
Secondly, it supposes the effective refusal to apply discretionary
national measures in trade policy and competition promotion subjects in the
Community sphere. It also involves an unlimited confidence in the market's
capacity to correct, on its own, the economic problems that may arise. The
theoretical conception that underlies behind this planning states that problems
derived from the existence of competition differentials shall be solved through
the prices mechanism.
However, it happens that the reality shows that productive factors'
prices are not very flexible when they are declining and that the mobility of the
employment is quite inferior than the one of the rest of resources, what produces
the appearance of unemployment as an adjust variable.
Thirdly, it favors the convergence of any other economic policy in just
one sense: the international competition established by prices favors the
decrease of the public sector's presence in financial and environment protection
spheres, as well as in those spheres related to the protection, from the welfare
State, of those less favored groups, due to the additional cost that these
interventions include in a national production that must compete with those
8 This situation continues and worsens in the new financial framework that4genda
2000 supposes, where additional resources are not included, for example to face the costs of
the EU's expansion towards the East, as well as the new definition expdenced by Structural
Funds' objectives. In this sense, J. Colom i Naval's opinion is clarifying: "puede decirse que el
conjunto de la Agenda 2000 estdi supeditad a la ampliaci6n y que, en funci6n de dsta, se
orientan todas las demds politicas y, mts precismente, en funci6n de conseguir financiar Ia
ampliaci6n sin aumento del presupuesto" ("Agenda 2000: nuevas perspectivas financieras para
Ia UE", in Inforniacin Comercial Espahola, n° 776, February 1999, p. 33).
9 Cf. D. Yerguin and J. Stanislaw, op. cit. pp. 467 and ss.
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from another countries where public regulation is "more favorable."
As A. Grjevine says, it seemed that European countries refused their
autonomy in benefit of a Community macroeconomic policy that actually does
not exist. National macroeconomic policies have got no European substitute.
Thus, we are going progressively towards a pure and simple abandonment of
the economic policy. 
10
E. The Backgrounds of the European Monetary Union
The second great project around which is articulated the relaunch of
the process of building of Europe is the creation of a Monetary Union. Behind
this project underlies the idea that the advantages of the international productive
specialization will only be used to its maximum if payments between States take
place in conditions of confidence about the value and convertibility of the
currencies. That is, without monetary uncertainty. These objectives have been
answered by the different Monetary Systems or exchange regimes designed
through the history and, of course, by the regime that was created in Bretton
Woods Agreements in 1944.
This institution created an unparalleled monetary world stability that,
in addition, was enhanced at a regional level by the creation in 1950 of the
Payment European Union, which warranted a wide convertibility of the
included currencies. Thus, and also because the just ended war that had
confronted the new economic partners recommended to delay the discussion
about a subject as delicate and linked to national sovereignty as currency, the
Treaty of Rome hardly considers in a marginal way the monetary subjects.
But once completed the first stage of institutional consolidation and
enforced the first Community policies, the Commission wondered about the
convenience of advancing in the monetary integration project. This was
influenced, between other reasons, by the increasing lost of confidence in the
American currency, as a result of the increase of the number of circulating
dollars in a ratio much higher than the increase of gold in the Federal Reserve.
Its main ideas were reflected in the Community's action program
during the second stage of the Common Market (1962), where, by first time,
appears the idea, though very shyly, of the establishment of a monetary union
by stages. Despite the agreements included in this Program, the decade is
characterized by the systematic violation, by different European States, of the
signed monetary agreements -Italy, France and Federal Germany modified the
exchange rates of their currencies without the already obligatory authorization
of the European authorities-, and also by the existence of opposite approaches
within the Community in the subject of monetary cooperation.
Only at the end of the decade some wishes are united and in The
Hague summit, in December 1969, the common project of monetary union is
relaunched. All this is favored, on one hand, by the need to give a response to
the progressive disintegration of the International Monetary System, what
significantly reduced the growth possibilities derived from intra-Community
trade. And, on the other hand, by the increase of the financial dependence
10 A. Grjevine, Apris Maastricht: des dcurs el des ch6meurs? at 7, (Cntre d' Etudes et
des Recherches Intemationales de la Fondation National des Sciences Politiques, Working
Paper No. 3, 1992).
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between the developed countries, what increases the vulnerability of national
financial markets to perturbations of this nature that may take place in the
international sphere.
The final agreement, known as Werner Report (1970) and mainly
included in the Council Resolution of March 1971, proposes a simultaneous
advance in the subject of coordination of economic policies and monetary
integration to be carried out in different stages during that decade. However,
the monetary union project was left aside as a consequence of the international
affairs' evolution.
In the monetary sphere, there are important speculative tensions
against the dollar that compel to let the german mark and the dutch florin float
freely. Meanwhile, the American government declares in 1971 the non-
convertibility of the dollar in gold. The Washington Agreements (1972) hardly
get to restore the calm to international financial markets, and the post-war
International Monetary System fails in 1973. From that year on, a flexible
exchange rate system is established. And in the real sphere, the structural crisis
of the majority of States' productive systems is joined by the mark-up in the
prices of energetic products.
With these circumstances, and due to the lack of precision of the
monetary integration plan, European governments agreed different controlled
floatation systems for their currencies. These systems were characterized by
improvisation and by the lack of effective and symmetric intervention
mechanisms to warrant their fulfillment. The European Monetary Snake (in and
out of the tunnel) is a good example.
During its operation period, there were numerous realignments and
many entries and exits of currencies in the exchange mechanism, provoked by
the monetary speculation and the evolution of the participant governments'
political wish, what shows in a great measure its relative failure.
F. The European Monetary System: Predecessor of the
European Monetary Union
Despite these facts, the idea that it was necessary to advance in
monetary coordination (common monetary policy, complete convertibility of
currencies and stable exchange rates) continued unaltered and even enhanced by
the conjunction of a series of works in the second half of the seventies,
especially by the Optica reports. On the basis of these theoretical contributions,
and once solved the most serious effects of this first stage of the economic crisis
-what allowed to deepen into another fields of political action-, the European
Monetary System was designed. This system, after being passed in the Brussels
summit, came into force in 1979.
The basis of this new stable but adjustable exchange rates system, with
a basket-type currency (the European Currency Unit or ecu), 11 was not very far
away from the basis contained in the European Monetary Snake. This was due,
between many other reasons, to the fact that despite its limitations, it was able to
establish considerably the value of the European currencies, especially when
compared to the other currencies. It was necessary to overcome some national
11 The denomination of the single European currency was modified in the European
Council of Madrid 1996, where its name was changed by euro.
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oppositions and to correct some technical deficiencies related, especially, to the
mechanisms used in order to detect the divergent currency, and to the
improvement of the financial support mechanisms' for the parity sustainibility.
The new system was able to join the majority of the countries'
reluctance in the monetary subject, as it can be proved by the fact that all the
countries, except Great Britain, joined this system and its exchange mechanism,
whose appurtenance was voluntary. If we do not consider the unavoidable
speculative chapters, we can conclude that during the EMS's operation years, it
worked in the right way from the monetary point of view, despite the I I central
parity modifications that happened between 1979 and 1990. These
modifications can be explained by the unequal effectiveness of the national
policies to face the new energetic impacts and to keep their external balances in
function of the national productive systems' evolution and of the international
trade's new tendencies.
The success in the sphere of monetary stability attributable to the EMS
encouraged the Community authorities to deepen into the monetary
cooperation, more and more convinced that the advantages of the single market
could only be used to the maximum if the interchanges were carried out with
currencies submitted to a set of rules even stricter and, above all, if a Monetary
Union was created.
G. The Maastricht Treaty and the European Monetary Union
With the aim of getting going the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), the Commission ordered a report -later known as Delors Report-
where, as well as analyzing the possible consequences that may derive from the
Union, they established the conditions and requirements to be met to create a
Monetary Union globally profitable from an economic point of view.
The project became more definite, in a political sphere, first in the
Council of Rome in 1990 and, specially, in the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.
where the monetary union received the unanimous support of the Member
States, since it was defined in close collusion with characteristic principles of
the dominant liberal ideology, which was in that moment in its period of
greatest importance.
The theoretical advantages of the EMU were presented in the Emerson
Report (1990), better known as One Market One Money. Those in charge of the
theoretical content of that report ensured that the EMU would contribute to a
higher degree of microeconomic effectiveness, macroeconomic stability and
equity within the European Union.
In a more precise way, and following partially the exposition made by
M. Ahijado, 12 the most remarkable advantages, from a theoretical point of
view, derived from the set of a single currency are:
(i) Any uncertainty related to the exchange rates' evolution shall disappear,
and the comparison of the goods' prices is favored, what helps the
development of any kind of economic transaction within the Union.
(ii) The reduction of the interest rates in European economies is favored by
the higher credibility of the new European monetary authority (the




European Central Bank), as well as the increase of the competition
between financial intermediates.
(iii) Transaction costs related to Community currencies exchange
operations would be eliminated, that is, the costs of the financial
intermediates (commissions, differentials between buying and selling
prices, etc.) disappear.
These three advantages insist on the idea that the single currency
intensifies the degree of economic integration between the countries of the
European Union, that it promotes competition and favors the appear of scale
economies, since it eliminates monetary barriers that make difficult an authentic
single market
(iv) It favors the prices' stability by at least two reasons: first of all,
because of the disappearance of the possibility to correct by
modification in the exchange rates the effects on the trade of the
inflation differentials between countries. And in second place,
because the new Central Bank's independence status isolates its
decisions from any political influence, especially from the public
deficit's monetary financing attempts.
(v) It increases the standards of investments, because the interest rates
decrease as a consequence of the new favorable expectations that arise
with the integration.
Despite what has been said, it is remarkable the fact that in spite of the
considerable benefits that are expected from a theoretical point of view, the
examples of monetary integration in the world are the exception. In Europe, for
example and if we except the singular cases still into force of the Belgium and
Luxembourg monetary union, and the one of Germany after its reunification -
preceded by a political union-, the rest of unionist experiences failed, in the
best of the cases, only a few decades after its establishment. All that suggests
that the creation of a monetary union, as well as the logical technical problems
and political objections, has also some doubts from an economic point of view.
The referred advantages are joined by costs and limitations that, in function of
its size, may advise against the union.
H. The Advantages of the EMU Under Debate
The first great theoretical contribution to the study of the problem of
the adoption of a fixed exchange rates system, inherent characteristic of every
monetary union, is dated in 1953 and it is due to M. Friedman. In his work
Essays in Positive Economics, the American states that "a flexible or floating
exchange rate system... [is] absolutely essential to reach our fundamental
economic objective: to get and hold a free and flourishing world community
with a multilateral trade without restrictions. There is hardly some aspects of the
international economy where the implicit acceptation of a fixed exchange rate
system does not suppose serious problems or obstacles." But in addition to this
general objection, applicable to each monetary union, the EMU has got another
specific limitations and costs.
I. Limitations
The supposed advantages before mentioned inherent to every
monetary system with a single currency must be explained:
(a) The single currency's contribution to the monetary stability in Europe
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may be less decisive than what is thought, since the speculative chapters, for
instance, will not disappear. There will only be a change in the actors: now the
new European currency, the euro, will take the place of national currencies in
this sphere, and also in relation to the rest of international currencies, where
there is a freely floating exchange rate. 13
(b) The transaction costs associated to the operations of currency exchange
in order to make changes with foreign countries are, in practice, very reduced.
In fact, a remarkable percentage of international transactions take place between
different sections of a transnational enterprise, so the payments do not suppose,
nowadays and without a single currency, any transaction costs. Transactions on
large scale between countries with a high degree of reciprocal trade, as it
happens in the European Union, are carried out with payment compensation
systems between States that involve no currency exchange.
(c) Finally, the monetary uncertainty does not play. in international trade,
the part that it has played in another times, so its reduction will hardly have
positives effects on that trade. Nowadays the future markets act as actual anti-
risk insurance for all those who carry out economic operations abroad.
2. Costs
The implantation of a single currency in Europe also implies some
costs. We can point out, as the most significant, the following ones:
(a) It supposes the refusal to the exchange rate as an economic stabilization
instrument for external distortions. That is, as a faster and less costly adjust
variable, capable to correct a part of the defaults created by international shocks,
to keep the international competition degree of the country affected by an
asymmetrical distortion, and to recover its macroeconomic stability.
(b) In the same way, the exchange rate disappears as an automatic adjust
variable when distortions have an internal origin. When, due to any kind of
reason (for example, the damage of productive structures, increase of labor
troubles, decrease of enterprise competition, natural disasters, etc.), there is a
mark-up in prices and production costs in a country in comparison to the other
countries, its currency's devaluation -and so it has happened in the last
decades- supposes an automatic adjust mechanism, allowing that country to
hold its external trade share and preventing it from an additional damage in its
productive activity and employment due to the imbalance.
(c) And finally, as it is impossible to modify the exchange rate, the global
markets impose the deflation as a preferable strategy by the States to continue
with the degree of competition of their economies and their presence in
international markets.
In this way, financial incentives to the incorporation of new
technologies in productive processes are intensified in order to reduce unitary
costs in manufacture; the evolution of salaries (wages and social contributions)
is made responsible for the competition's losses: therefore, its evolution is
firmly controlled; the sustainibility of Welfare State is discussed, while its
financing lies mainly on resources that produce a rise in production costs and
makes more difficult to place national products abroad, etc.
13 Cf. BARRY J. EICHENGREEN, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ACHITECTURE (Institute for International Economics 1999).
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In all the cases, we are dealing with measures with important
resdistributive implications, though all the measures have a clear regressive
character, as the main affected are wage-earners and those assisted by social
protection systems.
3. Tipping the balance
Taking into account what has been said before, the creation of a
monetary union -in addition to cultural, social, historic and, especially, politic
considerations that we want to make-, requires a consideration as exhaustive
as possible of the advantages and costs that may derive from that union.
In this sense, all theoretical contributions agree when they point out
that under some circumstances (if the economies meet some requirements), the
integration's advantages are maximized and its costs minimized. So it is set the
concept of optimal monetary area or zone that M. Ahijado and M. Navascuds,
for example, define as the geographical zone where there are a series of
conditions that allow to do without the exchange rate and to get profit from the
savings in transaction costs and change risk that flexible exchange rates
involve.14
Although there is no unanimity, the conditions that appear more
frequently in economic literature about this matter are:
(a) Goods, services and productive national factors markets must be very
flexible. That is, they must be free from foreign intervention preventing the
prices to react quickly to the changes that may take place in buying and selling
orders.
(b) A similar degree of opening between the integrated countries, as well as
similar characteristics of their trades, similar industry composition and similar
degree of financial development.
(c) An important volume of financial transfers to warrant interregional and
interpersonal solidarity, at least during the first stage.
(d) And finally, integrated countries must show evident similarities in their
internal prices and reduction rates.
If we do not consider the last condition, for whose consecution
European countries have made remarkable efforts since the Maastricht Treaty
was signed (where these two variables are defined as convergence criteria), and
nowadays, according to what was agreed in the Stability Agreement signed by
the Member States of the European Union, none of the other conditions is
totally fulfilled. 
15
Goods, services and productive factors markets, and singularly the
employment market, have a high degree of inflexibility as a consequence,
between other reasons, of the remarkable degree of intervention that there is in
every EU's economy. This intervention is due to the important protection and
regulation action that the European governments, without exception, carry out.
The differences in the rate and volume of external opening, the composition of
the industry and the financial network are huge, for example, between center-
14 MANUEL AHUADO & M. NAVACUEs, LECTURAS SOBRE UNION ECONOMICA Y
MONETARIA EUROPEA. UNIONES HIST6RICAS Y AREAS MONETARIAS 6PTIMAS (Pirmides 1998).
13 See JUAN JOSE R CALAZA, TEORiA ECON6MICA DE LA MONEDA UNICA (Pir-mides
1999) (for an exhaustive analysis of the nonoptimal nature of the EMU in Chapter 2).
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European economies and those of the South. And financial transfers with a
redistributive nature suppose hardly a remain, not only compared to the
Community's GNP, but also within its own budget.
At most, we can say that in the EMU there is a quasi-optimal area (but
not even in these case all the requirements would be met), integrated by
Germany, the Benelux, Austria, France and some nordic countries that,
consequently, would be the most benefited from all this process of monetary
union. But paradoxically, those are the countries with higher standards of
economic development. Thus, taking into account these considerations, it is not
difficult to conclude that the EMU, probably and such as it was foreseen in the
case of the economic union, will produce a worsening of the interregional
differences between Member States.
All this does not mean that the rest of countries do not get any profit of
the monetary union (they will, if the union entails more advantages than
economic costs), but, since they do not fulfill the referred conditions, the
monetary union's costs are very high. In these conditions, it would have been
advisable to make a strict and impartial previous study of the advantages and
costs of the single currency's implantation, especially by those States situated
out the quasi-optimal area. This study should also be considered when deciding
the evolution of economic facts. However, nothing of that has happened, partly
by the difficulty of the said study, partly because there was a determined
political wish to introduce the euro, no matter neither the circumstances nor the
costs.
II. Conclusion: The Consolidation of a New Economic
Orthodoxy in Europe
As it has been stated before, the idea that the evolution towards the
monetary union required that the countries had a degree of economic
homogeneity was a constant, both for those studying the subject and for the
members of the experts committee (presided by Delors), in charge of the
preparatory works previous to the single currency.
The "convergence criteria" were set from that point of view, as
obligatory requirements to access to the monetary union in homogeneous
circumstances. Therefore, the interested States made remarkable efforts to meet
them and designed their economic national policies in the service of those
requirements.
Many people, from many different points of view, have criticized those
criteria. These opinions have been based on very different aspects, from their
rejection because they do not warrant the real convergence of European
economies, until the denial of their nature of necessary requirement for the
establishing of an optimal monetary area. Maastricht convergence criteria, as
well as the institutional network designed in the EMU or the establishment of
the periods, were the result of a complex forces balance -forces that sometimes
were opposite and with circumstantially coincident interests-, more than the
result of an exhaustive analysis of the necessary conditions for the success of
the monetary union.
This does not mean that all the steps of the process had no economic
logic because they were only the result of an political agreement with
concessions. For instance, the similarity of the interest rates is located in an
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economic space where capitals move freely, although its definition has not been
complete. But other requirements are very influenced by certain opinions with a
soft scientific basis, but with a clear political interest.
For example, of the established limit for the volume of national debt
that the government could hold, which was set in 60 percent of the GNP, in
great deal because most candidates to the EMU had a debt levels around that
ratio, and to ensure a degree of budgetary discipline and austerity in public
expenditure, no matter the political tendency of the future governments. To the
same objective contributed the criterion that set in 3 percent of the GNP the
maximum annual public budget deficit. Or the European Central Bank's
objectives and competence -designed as those of the Bundesbank which
became the authentic guardian of Europe's economic orthodoxy.
The time has given, in a great deal, the reason to those who stated that
the way that had been chosen to get the EMU was just one between the many
possibilities, and that it had been chosen by reasons that hardly agreed with the
economic interests of the majority. This way had been organized in stages,
conditions and requirements that were supposed to be necessary to conclude
successfully the process, assumed without too many barriers by the public
opinion since they were considered unavoidable for a desirable project, the
European integration. These stages, conditions and requirements were not
enough for the EU to be considered as optimal monetary area, but they were,
however, enough as neoliberal necessary adjust measures to make economic
systems more flexible, to restore the markets' power in the government of the
economies, and to improve the profitability possibilities of the private capitals.
All that has been confirmed, for instance, by the following facts: in
first place, by the approval of the Stability Agreement in december 1996 in
Dublin Council. It is a mechanism introduced at the request of the German
government and under which is delayed sine die the objective of the public
expenditure control, since those States with an annual budgetary deficit higher
than 3 percent are punished, even after their access to the single currency. 16
And in second place, because finally a great deal of countries have been
authorized -included Germany- to access to the third and last stage of the
EMU, even if they did no meet all the convergence criteria, without considering
in a literal way some of the principles of the EMU Treaty and stating that those
principles were not realistic, were not necessary or were just an excuse to carry
out some adjusts in the economies.
Consequently, from what we have exposed, we can deduce that the
modem monetary union process does not suppose a valid initiative to favor a
balance development of Europe. However, it is an efficient, until a certain
extent, mechanism to promote trade interchanges and, above all, to restructure
the European economies in order to set them in service of the globalization and
W, Member States must present, under that Agreement, their Stability Programs, where
they shall explain their annual deficit objectives. Only if there are, in the opinion of the
Council (Ecofin), exceptional circumstances-annual fall of, at least, 2 percent of the GNP as
the general tendency- that "excessive deficit" shall be allowed. If it were not like that, fines
-not remunerated deposits that are lost if the country does not correct the situation in two
years- would be of 0.2 percent of the GNP and an additional tenth for every point that make
the deficit be over 3 percent, until a maximum of 0.5 percent of the GNP.
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reformation of the national governments' actuation in their economies.
Otherwise, we cannot understand the lack of attention to the real convergence
during the whole union process (employment, investments, GNP per capita, or
production), real preconditions for the social welfare, the obviously restrictive
nature of public policies applied and the lack of Community competence in
those spheres that, by legal or economic impositions, are not considered by
national governments.
